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REVISITING THE SIMILAR FACT RULE IN SINGAPORE 
 
 
Public Prosecutor v. Mas Swan bin Adnan and another1 
 
 
 
CHEN SIYUAN* 
 
 
 
The similar fact rule in Singapore—as with the law on any evidence law doctrine that can be found in both 
our Evidence Act and the common law—has required clarification for some time. This note, which 
discusses the latest local decision on the similar fact rule, considers if that decision is compatible with the 
Evidence Act and the various conceptualisations underlying the doctrine.  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: DIFFICULTIES SURROUNDING THE SIMILAR FACT RULE 
 
The similar fact rule (or the similar fact evidence rule, depending on choice of terminology) 
essentially limits the admissibility of evidence that goes not towards proving directly that an 
accused has committed the crime he has been charged with but towards his past conduct, and that 
may form a basis for inferring that the accused has committed the said crime.2 However, the 
similar fact rule in Singapore is not free of controversy, and was once described as being faced 
with “intractable difficulties”.3 These difficulties, which remain today, can probably be attributed 
to at least three factors.  
The first and logically prior factor is the perennial tension between our Evidence Act4 and the 
common law. Section 2(2) of the Evidence Act states: “All rules of evidence not contained in any 
written law, so far as such rules are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, are 
repealed.” Taken literally, section 2(2) precludes a court from adopting wholesale common law 
developments in evidence law, and instead directs it to give precedence to the provisions in the 
statute. Notwithstanding this, our courts have not always been consistent in interpreting and 
following section 2(2).5 This is certainly true in the specific context of the similar fact rule, 
where over-valiant attempts by our courts to harmonise statute and common law have come at 
the price of stretching the similar fact provisions in the Evidence Act beyond recognition.6 While 
this problem is now largely ameliorated by the 2008 decision of Law Society of Singapore v. Tan 
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2
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3
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5
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6
  Both the specific Evidence Act provisions and the cases in question will be discussed later in this piece. 
Guat Neo Phyllis—which stated that “new [common law] rules of evidence can be given effect 
to only if they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the [Evidence Act] or their underlying 
rationale”7—there still remains a whole host of cases that have blurred the exact contours of the 
similar fact rule, including a Court of Appeal decision.8 
The second factor, though parasitic upon the first, is arguably the more important one. It is 
the dilemma surrounding the normative conceptualisation of the similar fact rule: under what 
circumstances should the accused’s acts on other occasions (i.e., separate from the crime he is 
charged with) be considered relevant (and therefore admissible to prove his guilt)?9 Granted, 
there is the “institutional” consideration in admitting only good evidence so that the trial is not 
unnecessarily protracted, fact-finders are not distracted/confused, and sloppy criminal 
investigation is not encouraged.10 But the primary objection to similar fact evidence has to be 
prejudice.11 Indeed, it has been said that while an accused’s prior misconduct may seem 
intuitively and even logically relevant (and therefore aids in the court’s search for the truth), such 
evidence “is generally more prejudicial than probative”.12 This is because such evidence is 
unconnected to the offence, catches the accused by surprise in court, and may unduly influence 
the trier of fact by painting the accused as a criminal from the outset.13 There are, of course, 
other possible dimensions to the idea of prejudice, and they are aptly summed up as follows: 
 
‘[P]rejudice’ does not refer simply to the tendency of the evidence to incriminate the accused 
in respect of the crime charged. Used in that sense, all evidence adduced by the prosecution 
must almost invariably be prejudicial … [T]he word must obviously mean something else. It 
consists of a number of ideas. 
 
One is the risk of cognitive error. Our instinctive assessment of the evidence of past 
conviction may be off the mark … [T]he public tends to over-estimate recidivism rates … 
[T]hat criminals tend to recommit the same sorts of crime—is not wholly supported by 
empirical data … [P]eople have a tendency to draw stronger inferences from evidence of past 
acts than is rational …  
 
Another aspect of prejudice is based on the idea that we cannot run away from the emotional 
aspect of our existence. Evidence of the accused’s past conviction has the power to sway us 
unduly against him. We may be tempted to convict the accused not because the evidence, 
construed objectively and dispassionately, supports the charge but because we find the 
person repulsive… 
 
There is [also] the fear that [the accused] may be deprived of [the benefit of the presumption 
of innocence] because of the strong antipathy that the fact-finder may feel towards him when 
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his hideous past is revealed. The fact-finder may give the evidence more weight than it 
objectively deserves … 
 
A person should be allowed to start his life afresh; he should not bear, for the rest of his life, 
the burden of his past … ‘[O]nce a criminal has “paid his debt to society” he should not be 
additionally penalised for that behaviour’.14 
 
The third factor is related to the second and may be considered a subset. As will be seen, the 
number one counterpoint and antithesis to prejudice is probative value (which, by basic logical 
definition, goes towards relevance—and relevance per se lends itself to various definitions and 
conceptualisations).15 The essence of conventional similar fact rule discourse usually boils down 
to this: if the probative value of a piece of similar fact evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect, 
that evidence is admissible. Objection has been raised to such a weighing exercise, however. In 
particular, the objection takes aim at how it is not easy to ascertain probative value (which in 
turn affects our understanding of prejudice and relevance), and as a result, politics enter into the 
court’s calculus: 
 
First, specific instances of past behaviour are offered to the court. The court must then decide 
that the track record justifies the conclusion that the accused possesses a trait, disposition or 
propensity to act in a certain way. Finally, the court must believe that, under the 
circumstances which the accused is charged, that particular trait translated itself into action. 
Each of these steps is fraught with danger. Establishing a particular disposition is no easy 
matter … We need to know much more about the character and makeup of the individual and 
the precise factual context in which the past behaviour was manifested. A court of law 
normally has neither the time nor the patience to engage in these details … [T]he reasoning 
process requires the court to make involved decisions as to whether the accused has the 
particular trait, and whether the specific situational trigger was present. This can only be 
satisfactorily done if the courts are willing to delve into the precise psychological makeup of 
the accused.16 
 
It is submitted that the similar fact rule in Singapore has been in an uncertain state for some time, 
in part because there has not been much judicial discourse in resolving the difficulties sketched 
out above. Mas Swan is a post-Phyllis Tan decision and also the latest authority on the similar 
fact rule in Singapore. This piece considers if Mas Swan has made any inroads in resolving any 
of the aforesaid difficulties. 
 
II. FACTS OF MAS SWAN 
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 The accused were Malaysians. The first was Mas Swan, a 27-year-old male. The second was 
Roshamima, a 24-year-old female. They were a couple and had planned to marry. However, their 
marriage plans halted when they were arrested at Woodlands checkpoint upon entering 
Singapore in a Malaysian-registered car. 21.48 grams of diamorphine, contained in three bundles 
and 123 packets, were found in the car.17 They were charged under section 7 of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act,18 read with section 34 of the Penal Code.19 Their accounts as to what happened 
differed in material aspects. 
Mas Swan claimed that while he knew that there were bundles concealed in his car, he 
thought they were ecstasy pills because that was what Roshamima had told him.20 Roshamima, 
on the other hand, claimed that she did not even know of the existence of any bundles.21 She said 
that Mas Swan and her had entered Singapore that day only to obtain gifts for their engagement 
and wedding.22  
As it were, the court found that Mas Swan was delivering the bundles on behalf of one 
Mickey, and had previously (together with Roshamima) made four successful drug deliveries for 
him.23 Furthermore, Mas Swan became involved in delivering drugs only after Roshamima had 
recruited him and introduced him to Mickey, for Roshamima herself was already delivering 
drugs for Mickey before that.24 Indeed, between Mas Swan and Roshamima, it was always the 
latter who took the lead in all the deliveries; Mas Swan was never told of the destinations, never 
involved in the packing of the bundles, never in the thick of the modus operandi, and never the 
direct recipient of the bundles.25 Only Roshamima was aware of the detailed modus operandi 
(involving, among other things, exchanges of cars) in which Mickey ran the drug delivery 
operations. Moreover, when the couple was detained at Woodlands checkpoint, all the frantic 
calls from Mickey (and Murie, another of Mickey’s associates) went only to Roshamima’s 
mobile phone.26  
So while the court accepted that Mas Swan believed Roshamima when she told him they 
were delivering ecstasy pills before they got caught, it did not accept that Roshamima did not 
know that the purpose of the visit to Singapore was to deliver the bundles of controlled drugs 
that were concealed in the car.27 As a result, Mas Swan was acquitted and Roshamima was given 
the mandatory death penalty (albeit under a judicially modified charge due to Mas Swan’s 
acquittal).28 
 
III. JUDGMENT IN MAS SWAN 
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 While a significant portion of the judgment in Mas Swan focused on the issues of statements and 
the presumptions under the MDA (and indeed the resolution of those issues were sufficient for 
the court to reach its verdict),29 the comments in this note will, for present purposes, be confined 
to the similar fact rule. Specifically, the question was whether evidence of the previous drug 
deliveries could be used to make the finding that Roshamima knew that the bundles in the car 
contained controlled drugs. Chong J. noted the following: 
 
(1) The relevant provisions of the Evidence Act that govern the admissibility of similar fact 
evidence are ss. 14 and 15. Section 14 states that ‘Facts showing the existence of any 
state of mind, such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or 
good-will towards any particular person, or showing the existence of any state of body or 
bodily feeling, are relevant when the existence of any such state of mind or body or 
bodily feeling is in issue or relevant.’ Section 15 states that ‘When there is a question 
whether an act was accidental or intentional or done with a particular knowledge or 
intention, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of 
which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.’ 
(2) In Tan Meng Jee, the Court of Appeal explained that similar fact evidence was generally 
excluded because “to allow it in every instance is to risk the conviction of an accused not 
on the evidence relating to the facts but because of past behaviour or disposition towards 
crime. Such evidence without doubt has a prejudicial effect against the accused. 
However, at times, similar facts can be so probative of guilt that to ignore it via the 
imposition of a blanket prohibition would unduly impair the interests of justice.”30 
(3) In Tan Meng Jee, the Court of Appeal held that ss. 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act 
contained the test set out in the House of Lords decision in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Boardman,31 i.e. the admissibility of similar fact evidence is determined 
by balancing its probative value against its prejudicial effect.32 This was despite the fact 
that ss. 14 and 15 literally adopted a categorisation approach (i.e. admissibility of similar 
fact evidence was determined solely by the categories of relevance under ss. 14 and 15). 
It pointed out that illustration (o) of s. 14 was instructive: ‘A is tried for the murder of B 
by intentionally shooting him dead. The fact that A on other occasions shot at B is 
relevant as showing his intention to shoot B.’ It also pointed out the term ‘similar 
occurrence’ in s. 15 implied the balancing test. At any rate, courts have the general 
discretion to exclude any kind of evidence prejudicial to the accused, depending on 
whether it would be just or unjust to do so.33 
(4) But in view of Phyllis Tan, the admissibility of similar fact evidence has to be determined 
according to the categories of relevance under ss. 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act; 
therefore, Tan Meng Jee is inconsistent with the Evidence Act insofar as it allows for the 
exclusion of similar fact evidence that is otherwise deemed relevant under ss. 14 and 15. 
Nevertheless, cases that have interpreted Tan Meng Jee to mean that the more ‘similar’ 
the evidence, the more probative it is, are consistent with ss. 14 and 15.34 
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(5) Both ss. 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act permit the admission of similar fact evidence to 
show the state of mind of the accused. Based on Indian authorities,35 s. 14 ‘deals with the 
relevancy of facts showing intention, knowledge … when the existence of any state of 
mind or body or bodily feeling is in issue’, and for s. 15, ‘when the act in question forms 
a series of similar occurrences, evidence of similar facts is admissible to prove intention 
or knowledge of the person and to rebut the defence of accident, mistake, etc.’36 
(6) Section 14 of the Evidence Act, however, is subject to the qualification that ‘the state of 
mind must be a condition of thought and feeling having distinct and immediate reference 
to the particular matter in question and cannot simply be evidence of general disposition, 
habit and tendency to do the act in question’.37 
 
Accordingly, given Roshamima’s defence, the prosecution had rightly sought to rely on section 
15 of the Evidence Act to admit evidence of her previous deliveries of bundles for Mickey to 
show that her latest delivery (the one resulting in her arrest) was just another instance of a series 
of deliveries of bundles for Mickey.38 After sifting through the evidence, the court held: 
 
[I]t was clear that … just like on the previous occasions, Roshamima knew that there had 
been an exchange of cars with one of Mickey’s men prior to their entering Singapore … 
 
[T]he circumstances surrounding the exchange of cars, such as the involvement of Mas Swan 
and Murie, the similar wait [for the car] to be returned to them after the exchange of cars, and 
the direct route into Singapore after taking back possession [of the car], were virtually 
identical to the previous times Roshamima delivered bundles for Mickey. 
 
The highly similar circumstances show that it was very likely Roshamima was aware that 
they were delivering bundles of controlled drugs into Singapore … [E]vidence in Mas 
Swan’s and Roshamima’s statements [is therefore] relevant and admissible under s 15 of the 
[Evidence Act]… [T]he ‘striking’ similarity between the similar fact evidence and the events 
on [the day Mas Swan and Roshamima were arrested] gives the evidence an explanatory 
force that is highly probative of the level of Roshamima’s knowledge [on the day of her 
arrest] … [T]he evidence was also admissible under the probative effect/prejudicial effect 
balancing test.39 
 
IV. SOME COMMENTS ON MAS SWAN 
 
As will be demonstrated, while Mas Swan achieves some mileage in addressing the three factors 
contributing to the “intractable difficulties” of the similar fact rule, it was not given the impetus 
to resolve most of them, and it even raises some new questions at the same time.  
Perhaps what is most immediately noticeable from the judgment in Mas Swan is that it 
categorically states that Tan Meng Jee, while a Court of Appeal decision, is incorrect in at least 
one aspect, viz., similar fact evidence can be excluded by the court even if it is relevant under 
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36
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  Mas Swan, supra note 1 at paras. 109. 
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sections 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act. What this means as well is that Mas Swan accepts that 
the balancing test in Boardman is still good law, and indeed it seems to have applied Boardman 
in its judgment.40 The part about the court not having the discretion to exclude similar fact 
evidence once it is relevant under the Evidence Act has to be correct, in view of Phyllis Tan.41 
The court should be lauded for taking proper cognisance of section 2(2) of the Evidence Act. But 
the part endorsing Boardman is questionable in at least one respect. On one hand, Mas Swan 
points out that there is one difference between Boardman and sections 14 and 15, viz., the former 
does not adopt a categorisation approach.42 This echoes academic sentiment.43 But there is 
another important difference not pointed out: “whereas the consideration of the prejudicial effect 
of the evidence is a vital aspect of the Boardman approach, it plays no part in the determination 
of admissibility under [sections 14 and 15]; it merely has a second stage role if the court should 
exercise its discretion.”44 Furthermore, the “recent retreat from applying the purposive approach 
to interpret [the Evidence Act] has left doubtful a string of authorities that used that approach to 
adopt 20th century common law rules, such as that for similar fact evidence in Boardman”.45 
Indeed, it is not clear from Mas Swan if one has to apply the balancing test in Boardman in 
conjunction with sections 14 and 15, or as an alternative to it. Compounding the confusion is the 
absence of reference to Director of Public Prosecutions v. P.46 In Boardman, it was said that if 
the evidence is “so very relevant” or “strikingly similar” that to exclude it would affront 
“common sense”, then it should be admitted.47 However, in DPP v. P, the House of Lords said 
that the striking similarity test was too narrow to be a general rule of admissibility.48 Given that 
DPP v. P has been cited by our courts,49 and given that Mas Swan now says that “decisions that 
have applied the ‘striking similarity’ test are … entirely consistent with ss. 14 and 15”, this is 
one unresolved contradiction. 
Even if Mas Swan is somehow suggesting that the Boardman balancing test does not 
contradict section 2(2) of the Evidence Act, it has been said that “the process of balancing 
probative value against prejudicial effect can be applied generally to any situation in which 
admissible evidence may result in injustice at trial.”50 Such a sentiment reflects the unhelpful 
reach and breadth of the test; and as has been pointed out at the introduction of this piece, there 
remains definitional uncertainties surrounding “prejudice” and “probative value”. For instance, if 
a piece of evidence has the attribute of “prejudice”, does it mean it has “a prejudicial influence 
                                                          
40
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50
  Pinsler, supra note 9 at 10.22. 
on the minds [of the fact-finders] out of proportion to its true evidential value”,51 or that it simply 
has no relevance (and therefore no evidential value whatsoever), serving only to unfairly colour 
the minds of the fact-finders to the extent of causing injustice? The balancing test presupposes 
that probative value and prejudice overlap, but such a presupposition is not necessarily correct, 
not in all instances anyway.52  
Indeed if we re-examine Mas Swan, it seems the court was looking for a specific modus 
operandi (connecting the previous deliveries to the one Roshamima was charged for), rather than 
a general pattern of behaviour or disposition. The facts pertaining to the previous deliveries 
could have been admitted, arguably without much obstacle, via other provisions in the Evidence 
Act—such as section 9 (facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or 
which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, are relevant), 
and perhaps to a lesser extent sections 8 (facts which show a motive or preparation for any fact in 
issue or relevant fact are relevant) and 6 (facts that are so connected with a fact in issue as to 
form part of the same transaction are relevant, even if they occurred at different times and 
places).53 Doing this would have obviated the unnecessary prejudice-probative value conundrum, 
but there are two possible counter-arguments to this. One, evidence admitted under Part I of the 
Evidence Act has to satisfy both the provisions in sections 6 to 11, and the remaining provisions 
that deal with “specific categories of relevant facts” (such as similar fact).54 Two, it remains 
unclear if sections 6 to 11 operate once a piece of evidence is found prejudicial; after all, 
Stephen—chiefly responsible for the contents of the Evidence Act—distinguished between 
relevant facts which arise directly from the circumstances of the case, and relevant facts arising 
from previous incidents or transactions.55 These two counter-arguments remain to be judicially 
addressed. 
Another point about modus operandi is that can it not be said that all similar fact evidence in 
the context of ascertaining the modus operandi (which in turn is used to establish the mens rea of 
the offence charged), once found to be relevant, will always be by definition probative and that 
prejudicial effect simply does not feature?56 Accordingly, if a piece of evidence tendered to 
establish modus operandi does not pass muster under the similar fact rule, it simply is irrelevant 
and inadmissible, and is most likely to be considered as pure propensity evidence used to 
establish disposition. But something stands in the way of this, because there are provisions in the 
Evidence Act governing character evidence57—in other words, evidence tendered to show 
disposition and reputation can be considered relevant under certain circumstances. There are two 
ways to resolve this ostensible paradox. First, under the Evidence Act, evidence to establish that 
the accused is a person of bad disposition or reputation can only be adduced if the accused gives 
evidence to establish that he is of good disposition or reputation.58 Secondly, we can distinguish 
between general similar fact evidence and similar fact evidence tendered to prove modus 
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  Perkins v. Jeffery [1915] 2 K.B. 702 at 707–708. 
52
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  Ibid., s. 56. 
operandi, since general similar fact evidence may overlap with character evidence, but similar 
fact evidence tendered to prove modus operandi will not.59 A parenthetical point about character 
evidence may be made at this juncture: it has been repeated ad nauseam in various cases that 
pure propensity reasoning is prohibited. Given that the genesis of this rule is probably John 
Makin and Sarah Makin, his Wife v. The Attorney-General for New South Wales,60 it might have 
been helpful if Mas Swan had commented on whether this aspect of Makin was compatible with 
the Evidence Act. 
Returning back to the difficulty of the balancing test, however, the balancing test must be 
considered a close relative of another generalised approach that has emerged from judicial 
practice—that of admitting all evidence at the outset, and according different weight or no 
weight at all to the different pieces of evidence thereafter. This approach makes sense (even if 
the Evidence Act is silent on it, thereby causing a section 2(2) issue to arise)61 because the court 
may want to take into account as many facts as possible to be apprised of the full picture. It is too 
cumbersome to consider the relevance of each tendered piece of evidence one at a time. Perhaps 
yet another alternative to the confounding balancing test is to say that once the court has the full 
picture, it decides which aspects of the narrative are relevant; those given no weight are simply 
irrelevant, and those that are given little weight should be considered to be tangentially relevant, 
as opposed to being almost outweighed by its prejudicial effect (so prejudice in effect is 
subsumed into relevance). After all, in Singapore’s system where there is only judge and no jury, 
there is not much point in worrying that (irrelevant) similar fact evidence is prejudicial because it 
may “taint” the judge’s judgment in some way—the judge will already have considered the 
evidence62 (although of course the counter-argument is that judges have better immunities 
against prejudicial evidence than juries).63 At any rate, that Singapore has no jury system has 
also led the former Attorney-General, now current Chief Justice, to comment at one point that 
the balancing test “should have little or no relevance in bench trials as the judge can simply give 
whatever weight is appropriate to the evidence. There is no need for a judge to go through the 
formal process of declaring the evidence inadmissible.”64 Perhaps then the best safeguard is to 
have the judge explain in the judgment why more questionable pieces of similar fact evidence 
were deemed relevant, particularly if the case turns entirely on similar fact evidence. Such 
explanations should also preferably be supported by the appropriate Evidence Act provisions. 
A final word on the balancing test for present purposes: ironically, the test is probably more 
compatible with section 11(b) of the Evidence Act than sections 14 or 15. Section 11(b) states 
that “Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant if by themselves or in connection with other facts 
they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or 
improbable”. I say it is ironic because there is much resistance to classifying section 11(b) as a 
provision pertaining to similar fact evidence in the first place: 
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 Stephen intended [section 11(b)] to be a residuary category for the preceding five sections (ss 
6 to 10) so as to cover facts which might not be caught by those provisions. Accordingly, s 
11(b), like ss 6 to 10, is limited to facts which are specifically connected to the facts in issue, 
and similar facts which are unconnected with the facts in issue can only be admitted under ss 
14 and 15 … This … is also evident in the two Illustrations to s 11 …65 
 
This leads us then to an interesting thought: 
 
If Boardman is not reconcilable with ss 14 and 15, is it reconcilable with s 11(b)? This 
section admits facts which have the effect of making facts in issue or relevant facts ‘highly 
probable or improbable’. It admits facts on the basis of probative force—the criterion of 
Boardman. Although there is no mention of the element of prejudice in s 11(b) as there is in 
Boardman, this factor might perhaps be regarded as being subsumed by the section on the 
basis that if a fact makes the fact in issue ‘highly probable’, the prejudicial effect of that fact 
will be correspondingly lowered …66 
 
Insofar as section 11(b) of the Evidence Act is more closely aligned with the balancing test than 
sections 14 and 15, perhaps the court in Mas Swan could have made a comment about it. 
Unfortunately, perhaps mainly because it was not pleaded (as was probably the case with 
sections 9, 8, and 6 of the Evidence Act), it was not discussed. It should also be added that 
section 11(b) has now become more synonymous with admitting similar fact evidence to prove 
actus reus, and the authority chiefly responsible for this is Lee Kwang Peng v. Public Prosecutor 
and another appeal.67 This new synonymy has also been met with resistance.68 This new 
synonymy, however, is nevertheless made on the aforementioned basis that the phrase “highly 
probable or improbable” in section 11(b) embodied the Boardman balancing test.69 Given that 
the court there reasoned on this basis despite being aware that this was contrary to the scheme of 
the Evidence Act as conceived by Stephen,70 it would be fascinating to see how the next decision 
on the similar fact rule connects more dots between the various Evidence Act provisions and 
cases.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
There are various ingredients to the current discourse on the similar fact rule: probative value, 
prejudice, and relevance. It remains unclear how they interplay with one another simply because 
there are unresolved conceptual and definitional issues with each of the ingredients, and this note 
has only highlighted bits of that. While Mas Swan helped clarify the law a little, dispelling the 
remaining ambiguities will have to be undertaken in another decision. 
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